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Main Points  
1.  Key findings regarding the structure of trade for tomato, rape, and onion into Lusaka are (a) 
regional trade is an important part of Zambia’s fresh produce system, (b) supply chains for 
tomato, rape, and onion are short, (c) the role of the modern market system is very small, and 
(d) the role of urban agriculture in supplying Lusaka markets for these vegetables is also small, 
though it is meaningful in the case of rape.   
2.  Main policy implications from this and related work are that (a) investments and policies to 
promote regional trade are relevant for the horticultural sector, not just food staples, (b) the 
traditional market system needs improved hard infrastructure linked to more collaborative 
public/private management models and improved coordination in the supply chains, and (c) 
more programmatic emphasis should be placed on helping existing traders scale-up and gain 
better access to information to do their job more effectively. 
 
INTRODUCTION: Rapidly growing urban 
populations and renewed growth in per capita 
incomes in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are 
creating major opportunities for local farmers by 
driving rapid growth in demand for food.  At the 
same time, these trends put enormous stress on 
the supply chains that these farmers rely on to 
respond to this increasing demand.  
 
Following a burst of enthusiasm through the 
mid-2000s, there now exists a broad consensus 
that supermarkets are likely to grow much more 
slowly than once thought in SSA (Tschirley et 
al, 2009; Humphrey 2006; Traill 2006; Minten 
2009).  This emerging consensus suggests that 
private investment in modern, integrated supply 
chains cannot be relied upon as the sole solution, 
over an acceptable time frame, to the multitude 
of problems that increasingly plague traditional 
production and marketing systems (logistical 
inefficiency, deteriorating infrastructure, high 
product wastage, urban congestion, and food 
safety concerns).  Public engagement will be 
central to any improvement in these areas.   
 
This public engagement must be based on a solid 
understanding of these systems and on new 
approaches to public-private collaboration.  Yet, 
while there is wide appreciation of the poor 
performance of many of these systems, little has 
been done to quantify the range of observed 
performance.  We begin filling this gap by 
examining the marketing structure of tomato, 
rape, and onion marketed into Lusaka. These 
crops are perhaps the three main “staple 
vegetables” in East and southern Africa, eaten 
on a daily basis by most people; in Lusaka, they 
account for more than half of all vegetable 
consumption. This Policy Brief draws from a 
much larger report that covers this and other 
topics (FSRP Research Report #46) 
 
DATA:  Primary data for this study come from 
three sources.  The Food Security Research 
Project (ACF/FSRP, carried out in collaboration 
with the Agricultural Consultative Forum) has 
collaborated with the Zambia National Farmers’ 
Union (ZNFU) since January 2007 to collect 
detailed information on prices and quantities of 
tomato, rape, and onion in Lusaka’s dominant 
wholesale market (Soweto). On Monday, 
Wednesday, and Friday of each week, market 
reporters collect information on all trucks 
entering the market with the three products.   
These data allow computation of total volumes 
and values flowing through Soweto.  Market   2
reporters also interview traders on the 
destination of product leaving Soweto.  
 
Additional primary data comes from the 
ACF/FSRP Urban Consumption Survey (UCS).  
This survey interviewed over 1,800 households 
in four urban centers of Zambia, including over 
600 in Lusaka, over two rounds in August 2007 
and February 2008.  These detailed data allow us 
to estimate the total size of the Lusaka market 
for these three products and the market share of 
various types of retail outlets (open air markets, 
street vendors, supermarkets, others).   
 
LUSAKA’S “MARKET SHEDS”:  Lusaka’s 
“market shed” is the geographical supplying 
product to the city.  Figure 1 maps these market 
sheds based on the districts that provided 80% of 
Lusaka’s supply of each crop from mid-January 
2007 through mid-January 2009
1. The 
geographical extent of these market sheds 
follows the perishability of the crops: 60% of the 
city’s onion comes from imports, half from 
Johannesburg, about 1,200 km away; five nearby 
districts provide 87% of the city’s tomato 
supply, while only the two closest districts 
account for 83% of Lusaka’s rape supply.  Very 
little of the supply reaching Soweto comes from 
peri-urban areas.  Even for rape, the most 
perishable of the three, production areas in the 
two main supply districts, though close to 
Lusaka, are rural in nature, and not peri-urban. 
 
Within each district, smaller production areas 
were identified based on definitions used by 
farmers and traders selling in Soweto; typically 
these areas follow local boundaries and could 
include one or several villages.  This measure 
reinforces the finding that production of rape is 
geographically more concentrated than tomato: 
53% of total rape supply to Lusaka comes from 
the top three areas, while only 28% of tomato 
does so (Table 1).  Figures for onion are 
misleading because Malawi and Johannesburg 
were each classified as a single “area”, though 
they draw on many production areas.   
  
CHANNEL MAPS
2:  We used data from the 
price and quantity collection system in Soweto, 
                                                 
1   We limited the period to 24 full months to control for 
seasonality in supply, necessary in this case to calculate 
accurate mean yearly figures.  
2  See Tschirley and Hichaambwa (2010) for more detail 
on how these channel maps were developed. 
along with UCS results and interviews with 
sellers in Soweto to construct channel maps for 
the three crops (Figures 2-4).  Key aspects of 
each map are summarized in Table 2
3.  
 
Table 1. Geographical Concentration of Marketed 
Production Flowing Through Lusaka 
Crop 
Concentration measure  Tomato Rape Onion 
No. of  production “areas”  115  93  42 
Share of total supply from:   
   Top 3 areas  0.28  0.53  0.65 
   Top 5 areas  0.39  0.59  0.75 
   Top 10 areas  0.61  0.73  0.93 
 
Soweto is by far the largest retail or wholesale 
market in Lusaka.  In 2007 and 2008 it 
transacted over 50,000 mt per year just of 
tomato, rape and onion, valued at over US$13m.  
Yet nearly all wholesaling takes place in an 
uncovered dirt field at one end of the market 
complex with no dedicated entry and exit points, 
very limited storage capacity, and no cold 
storage.  The Urban Markets Development 
Program, funded by the EU, made substantial 
investments in several retail markets of the city, 
including Soweto, but has ended without making 
any improvements in this wholesaling area. 
 
Retail channels for fresh produce include open 
air markets, the “ka sector” (small vendors that 
pursue sales by locating along busy pedestrian 
walkways and in residential neighborhoods
4), 
modern supermarkets, and private households 
producing in or near the city and selling to other 
households.  The main supermarket chain is 
Shoprite Checkers, which invested in 17 stores 
across Zambia (five in Lusaka) in 1997; over the 
past 3-4 years, Spar (a Dutch owned firm) has 
opened two outlets, while the local chain 
Melissa now has three outlets.  Shoprite 
Checkers procures fresh produce locally through 
Freshmark, its wholesaling partner.   
 
All percentages in the channel maps are based 
on our estimate of the total value at retail prices 
of all product flowing through the city; this is the 
sum of figures in all boxes located in the Retail 
section of each map (Figures 2 to 4).  
                                                 
3   ZK in the figure stands for Zambian Kwacha.   
4   “ka” is the diminutive in Bantu; thus kashop is a small, 
rudimentary shop, katable is a small table on which a 
vendor sells her wares, kantemba is a small “ntemba” or 
kiosk.     3
Table 2.  Key Structural Characteristics of Marketing Channels in Lusaka, by Crop 
Crop 
Share
1  Tomato Rape  Onion 
Marketed directly by farmers to retailers  0.07  0.65  0.03 
Flowing first through wholesale markets  0.83  0.35  0.40 
   Of which …       
   … sold directly by farmers in wholesale markets  0.48  0.35  0.26 
   … sold first to rural traders  0.35  0.00  0.14 
Sold by farmers to “modern wholesalers” and processors  0.09  0.00  <0.01 
Imported 0.00  0.00  0.58 
Purchased by consumers …       
   … in traditional markets and ka sector  0.48  0.96  0.39 
   … in supermarket chains  0.02  0.01  <0.01 
   … from urban producers  0.02  0.03  0.03 
Sold to institutional buyers within Lusaka  0.16  0.00  0.21 
Shipped outside of Lusaka  0.31  0.00  0.38 
1 Denominator is total value, at weighted average retail prices, of volumes flowing through Lusaka (wholesale and retail 
markets, modern wholesalers, and processors) 
 
Several patterns emerge. First, marketing 
channels are short.  Rape is the extreme case, 
with nearly two-thirds sold directly to retailers 
by farmers.  Tomato shows less direct farmer-
retailer marketing – 7% -- but nearly half of all 
its value is taken directly to wholesale markets 
by farmers.  Onion, due to its large market shed, 
shows the most intermediation, with 72% of all 
product brought to Lusaka by traders, not 
farmers (58% imported plus 14% of that 
originating within Zambia).  A second pattern is 
that Soweto serves as a major redistribution 
market for onion and tomato.  Over 30% of 
tomato reaching Soweto is exported to Living-
stone in the south and the Copperbelt and DRC 
to the north. Third, the role of the “modern” 
marketing sector is very small.  Of the total 
value of fresh produce purchased by consumers 
in Lusaka, 92% of tomato and onion and 96% of 
rape is purchased in open air retail markets or 
the “ka sector”. 
 
These exceptionally high shares held by the 
traditional marketing system prevail more than a 
decade after Shoprite first invested in Lusaka 
with 17 stores nationwide, and after two Spar 
outlets have also opened in the city.  Processors 
are important only in tomato, with about an 8% 
market share, held primarily by Freshpikt, which 
products canned tomatoes primarily for the 
export market. 
 
Fourth, regional trade dominates the onion 
system and is also important in tomatoes. Over  
half of onion reaching Lusaka is imported, and 
an important share of the 38% that is shipped 
from Soweto outside of Lusaka likely goes to the 
DRC.  Thus, Zambia is likely a net importer of 
onions, though data for other areas of the 
country to confirm this could not be found.  We 
find no evidence of imports of tomatoes, but 
indications from brokers and wholesalers in 
Soweto that probably more than half of the 31% 
that is shipped out of Lusaka is exported to 
DRC.  Zambia is thus likely a net tomato 
exporter.  Only in rape does regional trade play 
no role.   
 
Finally, evidence on the role of urban 
horticultural production is mixed.  The UCS 
shows that only 2% of tomato and 3% of rape 
and onions are purchased from other urban 
households.  Independently, the data on volumes 
entering Soweto show all important supply areas 
for all three crops to be at least several 
kilometers outside residential areas of the city.  
Yet 65% of all rape reaches retail markets by 
small scale retailers going to nearby farms and 
buying entire plots of rape.  These farms are 
likely close to the city and some may be 
considered urban.  More information is needed 
on this aspect of the trade to more firmly 
establish the importance of urban production of 
green leafy vegetables.  For tomatoes and onion, 
however, urban agriculture clearly plays a very 
small role. 
 
CONCLUSIONS:  Four key findings emerge 
from this research. First, regional trade is an 
important part of Zambia’s fresh produce 
system, especially for less perishable onion but 
also for tomato.  Second, supply chains for 
tomato, rape, and onion are short, meaning that 
relatively few transactions take place between 
farmer and consumer.  Third, the role of the   4
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Straight line (air) distance from district town to central Lusaka
(http://distancecalculator.globefeed.com/country_distance_calculator.asp)  5





















































































































































































































































































































modern market system in supplying Lusaka 
consumers with fresh produce is very small, 
rising from zero in 1997 to no more than 5% for 
any of the commodities.  Finally, the role of 
urban agriculture in supplying Lusaka markets 
for these vegetables is also small, though it is 
meaningful in the case of rape.   
 
The importance of regional trade in onion and 
tomato means that regional transport links, 
harmonization of trade regulations, avoidance of 
arbitrary border closings, and regional market 
information sharing – all issues typically 
addressed with vigor in cereals markets – are 
also important for improving performance of 
fresh produce markets.   
 
One implication of short supply chains is that 
more programmatic emphasis should be placed 
on helping existing traders scale-up and gain 
better access to information.  Helping farmers to 
bypass these traders and market their produce 
directly to supermarkets or processors will be 
appropriate in some circumstances, but most 
farmers will continue to rely on the existing 
fresh market trading system.   
 
The importance of the traditional marketing 
system, and the fact that it will remain dominant 
for many years to come, means that smart 
investment is urgently needed.  These 
investments must include hard infrastructure – 
the physical conditions for wholesaling in 
Soweto are deplorable – but such investments 
will generate very little benefit if not paired with 
a dramatically modified approach to 
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